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VOLUME 8 SPRING 1968 NUMBER 2
DUE PROCESS IN PROTECTIVE
ACTIVITIES
B. J. George, Jr.*
Major expansions of due process always start small. For exam-
ple, the Justices who wrote the Weeks opinion' in 1914 in no way
foresaw Mapp v. Ohio,2 Katz v. United States' and their progeny.
Anyone who forecast at the time Brown v. Mississippi4 was decided
that judicial codes regulating police interrogation and identification
procedures would be promulgated would have been thought a wild
visionary, yet this is the thrust of Miranda5 and the eye-witness
identification cases.6 The signs are abundant that the protective
processes by which organs of state assume responsibility for the
immature, the mentally abnormal and the disadvantaged are about
to undergo the most searching judicial examination under the due
process and equal protection clauses. The initial assaults on the
protective principle are most evident in the two areas in which
judical participation has been standard, juvenile court proceedings
and compulsory commitment of the mentally-ill, but the first skir-
mishes have already occurred in two areas traditionaly free from
judicial supervision, school administration and welfare administra-
tion. As has been true of the criminal law, the initial concern is
almost always with procedures, but an inevitable by-product is
judicial evaluation of the norms on which the procedures rest.'
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 297 U.S. 278 (1966).
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
7 The Supreme Court has made only a limited entry into substantive criminal
law; in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the defendant was punished
solely for being a narcotics addict. In Powell v. Texas, 389 U.S. 810 (1967), the Court
has granted review in a case of criminal prosecution of an alcoholic. On the problem
of intervention into substantive law on constitutional grounds see Packer, Making the
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The most striking recent case manifesting judicial control of
the protective activities of the state is In re Gault,' in which the
United States Supreme Court held that in "proceedings to determine
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in
which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,"' the respondent is en-
titled to notice of the charges, counsel, confrontation of prosecution
witnesses, and the protection of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion both in its judicial and extra-judicial form.'0 The direct scope
of the decision is of course narrow, but the Court is already con-
sidering further limitations on delinquency proceedings;"' it will not
be long until juvenile delinquency proceedings, and probably other
forms of juvenile court proceedings as well, will be completely
revised by judicial fiat.'2 The guiding premise almost certainly will
be that statements of benevolent purpose are no substitute for
fairness in administration, particularly if the therapeutic aims of
the protective system are unrealized in practice.
Therefore, we can expect that In re Gault will be cited by
analogy in contexts that bear no direct relationship to the delin-
quency proceedings that gave rise to it; it will be used as precedent
in the most expansive way. It is already possible to discern the
direction of judicial interest in both norms and processes in the
fields of civil commitment of the mentally-ill, school administration
and welfare administration that are the subject of this article.
I. DUE PROCESS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
Mental health legislation, like the juvenile court procedures
criticized in Gault,13 came into existence as an exercise of the protec-
tive parens patriae concern of the state, in this instance to protect
those whose mental condition or processes were such as to make them
a danger to themselves or to others. Legislation for this purpose is
found in every state,'4 much of it more than two generations old.' 5
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071 (1964), commenting on the dissent
to a denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
8 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 Id. at 41.
10 Id. at 55.
11 In re Whittington, 36 U.S.L.W. 3143 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (No. 36, renum-
bered No. 701), cert. granted, leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For a discussion
of the arguments which are presented by the case see 3 CRIme. L. RPTR. 4025 (April
10, 1968).
12 See Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY
L.Q., Dec. 1967, at 1; Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements
and Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967); George, Juvenile Delinquency Pro-
ceedings: The Due Process Model, 40 COLO. L. REV. - (1968).
13 See 387 U.S. at 17-24.
14 F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 44-48
(1961) (Hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE) lists the statutes. For an updating
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There is a certain amount of decisional law interpreting these
statutes, though until recently it related primarily to two problems,
(1) the constitutionality of the legislation itself 6 and (2) the prop-
erty rights and liabilities of those characterized as mentally ill.',
The first line of cases uncritically sustained the validity of the legis-
lation as based on the parens patriae power of the state;' 8 in most
respects it paralleled the decisions sustaining, on the same basis, the
constitutionality of early juvenile court legislation.19 The second
contains more decisions on a wider array of property questions than
any juvenile law counterpart, but in fact affected only the small
minority of mental hospital inmates or candidates who owned prop-
erty of enough value to make litigation worthwhile. An occasional
habeas corpus proceeding tested the legitimacy of a refusal to dis-
charge a patient,2 ° but for the most part the decision whether to
release turned on the conclusion as to whether the applicant or
relator was "insane," and not on the adequacy of the administrative
procedures by which that determination had been reached.2'
All indications are, however, that almost every aspect of civil
commitment proceedings and the standards on which they are based
will be re-evaluated by the courts. The emerging issues are along the
following lines.
Adequacy of the substantive standards. Statutes in the great
majority of states require as a condition of involuntary commitment
that the person to be hospitalized suffer from mental illness, mental
deficiency or epilepsy. These terms, however, are rarely defined. If
of the LnDMAv & MCINTYRE tables see Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 822, 872-78 (1967).
15 There are, however, new statutes in California, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 5550-78 (West 1966), the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-501 to -591
(1967), Illinois, SMITH-HURD ANN. ILL. STAT. ch. 91 Y2 (1966), and New York, N.Y.
MFNTAL HYGiNE LAW §§ 70-88 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
16 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (a sexual
psychopath case usually cited as leading authority); For other authorities see
Comment, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 STAN. L. REV. 109, 110-14
(1950).
17 See LINDMA & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 262-74; Weihofen, Mental
Incompetency to Contract or Convey, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 211 (1966).
18 The concept had an entirely different meaning in historical context. See Ross,
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicHi L. REv.
945, 956-60 (1959); Comment, The New Mental Health Codes: Safeguards in Com-
pulsory Commitment and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 977, 991 n. 78 (1967).
19 E.g., In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924) ; Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257
I1. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913) ; Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115
N.W. 682 (1908) (except for 6-man jury provision); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213
Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
20 See LiNHmAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 129.
21 E.g., Alexander v. Superintendent of Spring Grove State Hosp., 246 Md. 334,
228 A.2d 236 (1967); State ex rel. Barnes v. Behan, 81 S.D. 56, 131 N.W.2d 81 (1964).
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a definition is attempted, it often is either tautological22 or incor-
porates medical terminology from an earlier era that no longer cor-
responds to current psychiatric usage.28
There must, however, be something more than illness to justify
involuntary commitment. The usual standard is danger to the person
or property of others or danger to the safety of the person to be
committed.24 On the basis of this combined purpose to protect the
community against acts that would be criminal if done by a "normal"
person and to safeguard the person himself against physical harm,
the civil commitment statutes have generally been sustained as
constitutional. 25 But a number of statutes, including recent ones, also
turn on factors like the patient's "welfare ' 26 or his need for treat-
ment.27 This aspect of the statutes has also been in general sustained,
though reluctantly, in some of the recent decisions.28 However, there
is no clear indication why in this instance detention is possible be-
cause it benefits the detainee and not because direct protection of
the community demands it, when in other contexts only the latter
ground has been viewed as constitutionally significant.2 9 As a result
of legislative ambivalence toward the aims of mental health legisla-
tion, present substantive standards are ill-defined and essentially
uncircumscribed authorizations under the parens patriae power for
confinement of indefinite duration. The substitution in the mental
health statutes of epithets for definitions is typical of a dragnet
legislative approach observable in juvenile codes3° and criminal
vagrancy statutes.8 A number of recent decisions have struck down
22 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 (1967): "'[M]ental illness' means a psychosis
or other disease which substantially impairs the mental health of a person; 'mentally
ill person' means a person who has a mental illness . .. ."
23 Cf. MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.54 (1967).
24 See LINDMAN & McINTYRE, supra note 14, at 44-48 (tables of statutory provi-
sions); Project, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV., supra note 14, at 872-73.
25 See cases cited note 16 supra.
26 E.g., SMi'H-HuRD ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 91 1/2, § 1-8 (1966); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 2(8) (McKinney 1951).
27 E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5550 (West 1966); SMITH-HuRD ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 91%, § 1-8 (1966); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. § 330.21 (1967); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGiENE LAW § 2(8) (McKinney 1951).
28 See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
29 In re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) ; cf. Application of
the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
30 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.2 (1967): "[Rlepeatedly disobedient
to the reasonable and lawful commands of his parents . . . ," "repeatedly associates
with immoral persons, or who is leading an immoral life," "habitually idles away his
or her time," and "is in danger of becoming morally depraved"; N.Y. FAMLY CT. ACT
§ 712(b) (McKinney 1963): "an habitual truant or who is incorrigible, ungovernable
or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful
authority."
81 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961); Annot.
12 A.L.R.3d 1448 (1967).
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the traditional vagrancy statutes;82 it is very probable that juvenile
code language and the purported tests in civil commitment statutes
will also undergo attack. But it is more likely that the gross in-
formality in commitment procedures will first engage the courts'
attention.
Fairness of commitment procedures. One versed in the pro-
cedural safeguards surrounding a criminal proceeding is immediately
aware of the lack of emphasis placed on courtroom activity in civil
commitment proceedings; even the informal juvenile delinquency
proceedings struck at in Gault appear as models of procedural
regularity in comparison to most mental health procedures.
The first requirement of procedural fairness is that there be
advance notice that proceedings are to be held." Though the
statutes generally provide for some form of notice, it is also common
to authorize a withholding of notice because either it would be
detrimental to the respondent's health or it might disrupt treat-
ment.84 If notice is given, it is very probably in conclusory terms
drawn directly from the civil commitment statute itself.85 It is
doubtful, in short, whether in many cases there is constitutionally
adequate notice.
A second requirement of fairness in criminal and quasi-criminal
proceedings is that there be representation by counsel. No state pro-
hibits representation by an attorney, but in only about half is counsel
required to be appointed for an indigent respondent. 6 Even this
right is generally viewed as statutory only; there is but limited
authority that the right is constitutional.87 Either for lack of a
statutory obligation to appoint counsel or on the basis of a claimed
waiver of counsel, often drawn from the want of a specific request,
82 E.g., Alegata v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1967); Parker
v. Municipal Judge of the City of Las Vegas, 427 P.2d 642 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1967);
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 299 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967) ; cf. Note,
"Psycopathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation": Medical Terms or Legal Catch-
Alls-Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Alien, 40 Tasp. L.Q. 328 (1967).
88 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) ; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Simon v. Craft,
182 U.S. 427 (1901).
84 See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 25.
85 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5557 (West 1966); LUDWMAN & MCINTYRE,
supra note 14, at 23.
86 See LINDAN & McINTYRE, supra note 14, at 29, 100-03; Cohen, The Function
of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 424, 437
(1966); Note, The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings, 40 TEMP. L.Q.
381 (1967).
87 Dooling v. Overholzer, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); People v. Potter, 228
N.E.2d 238 (Ill. App. 1967) (under Sexually Dangerous Persons Act) ; People ex rel.
Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966) (on habeas




most respondents are in fact unrepresented by an attorney; if the
attorney appears his role is seldom clear to him.8 As a result, the
committee receives only perfunctory representation by counsel, less
effective by far than even that which an indigent criminal defendant
receives under a system of random assignment of uncompensated
counsel. Moreover, even a conscientious attorney faces great diffi-
culty in preparing his client's case adequately. The only means to
obtain data about an indigent respondent's mental condition is the
diagnostic commitment to a public hospital for observation that the
court always has the statutory power to order. 9 This commitment,
however, is in no way subject to the control of the attorney. ° There
is not yet any invocation of the equal protection concept paralleling
the criminal procedure cases on appeal4 and right to counsel 2
that requires the state to underwrite the cost of a qualified diagnostic
examination by private psychiatrists.
Fairness also requires a right to be heard. The statutes gener-
ally provide for a hearing before any long-term hospitalization can
be ordered. However, on the basis either of administrative activity
or an ex parte judicial order, it is possible to retain a person in in-
voluntary patient status for observation or treatment for periods
of, for example, nine,44 thirty45 or sixty days46 before a final judicial
determination of commitability is made. When the hearing is held,
in only a minority of states does the respondent have the right by
statute to be present.4 The hearing itself is brief and the evidence
is predominantly either hearsay or ostensibly expert testimony de-
livered in conclusory terms.4 8 The respondent himself may well be
examined by the court if he attends the hearing. The propriety of
the order may theoretically be tested through appeal, often in the
38 See Cohen, supra note 36; Note, 40 TEMP. L.Q., supra note 36, at 387-89.
39 See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 37.
40 See Id. at 89-93.
41 Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) ; cf. Roberts v. LaVallee, 36 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1967) (prelimi-
nary examination transcript).
42 Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
43 See LiNDMiAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 26-27.
44 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-523 (1967) (Initial detention without court order is
limited to 48 hours, but the court may order diagnostic commitment for not more
than 7 additional days.).
45 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 78(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967) (for observa-
tion).
46 SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 9 Y2 , §§ 7-1, 7-5 (1966); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
47 See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 27.
48 See Comment, Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 1067, 1068-72 (1966) (for two examples).
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form of a de novo hearing in a court of general trial jurisdiction, but
release is for the most part not obtained on review, but through
administrative release or habeas corpus in a court other than the
committing court.49
It is therefore apparent that if the concerns of the Gault case
were transferred to the routine civil commitment proceeding, the
inevitable conclusion would be that civil commitment proceedings
almost always lack fundamental due process. For the time being,
there is no direct Supreme Court authority laying down procedural
safeguards for purely civil proceedings. Nevertheless, there are a
few clear indications that any entry by the Court into the field will
bring about major changes.
In Specht v. Patterson ° the Court examined the Colorado
sexual psychopath law that permitted a trial judge to make an
indeterminate commitment after conviction if he found that the de-
fendant "constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the
public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill."'" The Court
decided that a statute in that form contemplated in essence a new
charge leading to a different form of criminal punishment. That
being so, due process required that the defendant be present and
represented by counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be able
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, be afforded
the opportunity to present affirmative evidence on his own behalf,
and be entitled to findings of fact "adequate to make meaningful
any appeal that is allowed."52 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, in a related vein, has held that without a new hearing
there cannot be an involuntary commitment of a criminal defendant
acquitted because of mental disease or defect,53 particularly if he did
not acquiesce in the entry of the insanity defense;54 while the de-
cisions turn technically on a question of statutory interpretation,
Cameron v. Mullen" recognizes that there are latent constitutional
issues in the problem.
Also of interest is Baxstrom v. Herold,56 holding that a convict
49 Cf. SMITH-HuRD ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91%2, §§ 10-13 to -15 (1966), which in
section 10-15 provides for transmission of the habeas corpus decision to the original
committing court, which then enters a finding of discharge on its records. The con-
flict of course arises from the fact that venue for habeas corpus is at the place of
confinement, Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), which is seldom the place of
original residence of the inmate.
50 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
51 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (1963).
52 386 U.S. at 610; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1967).
53 Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
54 Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
55 387 F.2d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
56 383 U.S. 107 (1966). For further discussion of Baxstrom and its aftermath,
1968]
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cannot be administratively transferred to civil mental patient status
at the expiration of the maximum term of imprisonment imposed on
him by a criminal judgment. Equal protection requires that he re-
ceive the same procedural safeguards that the ordinary civil com-
mittee has under statute. 7
There is also recent state authority invoking constitutional
safeguards in mental health proceedings, particularly the right to
counsel.18 Because of their functional relationship to criminal prose-
cutions, criminal sexual psychopath proceedings have been the first
to experience the new concern for procedural regularity inspired by
Baxstrom v. Herold.59 It is therefore probably only a matter of time
until the Supreme Court confronts directly the matter of procedural
fairness in civil commitment proceedings.
The question o1 treatment. Insistence upon a measure of due
.process will no doubt be countered by the same assertion offered in
opposition to efforts to bring juvenile procedures within the Con-
stitution, namely, that considerable adjustment in the usual pro-
cedural attributes of either a criminal prosecution or a civil trial is
necessary if the therapeutic goals of the protective system are to be
attained. As indicated earlier, the Court in Gault did not find this
argument persuasive, particularly when it did not appear that the
therapeutic ideal was being attained in practice."s The same doubt
must be expressed about civil commitment of the mentally-ill, for
the laudable aims posited for the mental health system have not
been attained;61 the system serves to promote the unjust ware-
housing of societal misfits.
Relevant studies show that the inmate and custodial worlds of
a mental institution differ in no significant way from those of a
prison.6 2 In terms of living conditions and the opportunity for
see SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW
RELATING TO INCOMPETENTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT 52-59, 221-28
(1968) (hereinafter cited as MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DE-
FENDANT).
57 Of related interest are Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), concerning
incompetence to stand trial, and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), on
punishment of addicts.
58 See cases cited in note 37, supra.
59 E.g., Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967) ; cf. Director of
Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).
60 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-29.
61 See generally Comment, Due Process for All--Constitutional Standards for
Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. Ciii. L. REV. 633 (1967); Com-
ment, U. PA. L. REV., supra note 48; Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967) ; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment,
53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967).
62 See Goffman, Concerning Institutions, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW 650 (J. Katz, J. Goldstein & A. Dershowitz ed. 1967).
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work and recreation, a prison is more often than not superior, toa
mental hospital . 3 Moreover, a prison inmate serving.other than a
mandatory life sentence can look forward to a definite time by which
he can be discharged; even the lifer has the near certainty that after
some period of time the governor will examine his case with pardon
or commutation in view. But a hospital inmate has no such assur-
ance.
This is, of course, a betrayal of the assumption underlying the
therapeutic principle that hospitalized persons will receive treat-
ment. In fact, however, there is no treatment of an acceptable kind
available in most state institutions. 4 Staff strength is inadequate,
and salary levels are so low that many state mental health workers
have only marginal qualifications." The promiscuous use of electro-
shock and insulin shock treatments that courts once thought to be a
permissible form of "treatment" and not cruel and unusual punish-
ment6 has given way to the administration of tranquilizers. These
may have treatment value in some cases, but all too frequently they
are used to produce placid but essentially unchanged inmates who
are easier to control than patients under active psychotherapy.
Quite often inmates are older persons cast off by family and society
alike, kept in hospitals and asylums because American society, in
unfavorable contrast to most cultures, refuses to shoulder responsi-
bility for the declining years of the indigent and rejected. 7 In short,
procedures essentially uncontrolled by due process of law have
consigned thousands of Americans 8 to a bleak form of incarcera-
tion terminated only by death. If by chance release occurs while an
inmate is still capable of leading a productive life, he is ostracized
63 See J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
LAW 700-02 (1967) (otherwise unreported table prepared by a hospital inmate to
support his application for habeas corpus).
64 See material cited in note 61, supra.
65 See MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT, supra note
56, at 171-90.
66 See Shock Therapy in State Hospitals, 64 Pa. D. & C. 14 (1948) (attorney
general's opinion); Comment, 77 YALE L.J., supra note 61, at 106.
67 Cf. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Application for Certifica-
tion of - - -, 172 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
68 To indicate the magnitude of the problem, the U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (88th ed. 1967) indicates that at the
end of 1964 there were 490,449 patients resident in state and county hospitals, and an
additional 199,599 mentally retarded persons in public institutions. The total for all
hospitals, including those on outpatient status, was 1,153,000. The WORLD ALMANAC
690 (L. Long ed. 1967) cites from National Institute of Mental Health sources a
figure of 602,690 patients resident in state and county hospitals at the end of 1964.
In comparison, the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 164, lists 214,336 resident
prisoners in federal and state prisons, while the WoRLD ALMANAC, supra, at 692 lists
214,356 prisoners in state and federal prisons and reformatories,
1968]
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as one who was "insane," in many respects to a greater extent than
if he had been adjudged "criminal" or "delinquent."6
Concern is beginning to be expressed whether civil commitment
without treatment does not deny equal protection and constitute
cruel and unusual punishment."0 Thus far no regular civil commit-
ment cases have presented the issue. However, three recent federal
court of appeals decisions in closely analogous situations indicate
there is a duty to treat mental patients.
In Rouse v. Cameron71 the court held that one involuntarily
committed to a mental hospital after acquittal on criminal charges
by reason of insanity has a right to treatment enforceable through
habeas corpus. The decision turns technically on an interpretation
of District of Columbia legislation requiring that "a person hos-
pitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treat-
ment. 7 - This, the court said, required a bona fide effort by hospital
staff to give therapy suitable to the patient's individual needs, the
adequacy of which is to be judged by contemporary psychiatric
knowledge. The failure to treat cannot be justified by want of staff
or facilities. 7' The authorities marshalled by Judge Bazelon, though
used in the course of statutory interpretation, are equally suited to a
decision based on constitutional grounds.
A companion case 74 applies exactly the same requirements to
commitments for sexual psychopathy. Indefinite commitment under
such a statute is "justifiable only upon a theory of therapeutic treat-
ment." That being so, "lack of treatment destroys any otherwise
valid reason for differential consideration of the sexual psycho-
path.) 75
The possibility of incarceration without treatment was also
the primary factor causing the court in Sas v. Maryland71 to express
reservations about the validity of the Maryland Defective De-
linquent Act.7 7 The court noted:
But a statute though "fair on its face and impartial in appearance"
may be fraught with the possibility of abuse in that if not administered
69 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1967).
70 See generally Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and
Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288 (1966) ; material cited in note 61, supra.
71 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (For subsequent outcome see note 54 supra, and
accompanying text.).
72 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967).
73 373 F.2d at 457-58.
74 Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
75 Id. at 473 (quoting LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 308).
76 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
77 MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B (1967).
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in the spirit in which it is conceived it can become a mere device for
warehousing the obnoxious and antisocial elements of society. Many of
the inmates in Patuxent are there by reason of offenses against property
rights. Many jurists and laymen would seriously question the wisdom
of the practice of indefinitely confining young men under these circum-
stances. Deficiencies in staff, facilities, and finances would undermine
the efficacy of the Institution and the justification for the law, and
ultimately the constitutionality of its application. 78
It is therefore evident that the foundation has been laid for
the development of a constitutional right to treatment, a substantive
right independent of the right to a procedurally fair hearing. A
decision to this effect will of course have the same devastating im-
pact on the compulsory commitment system that the impending pro-
hibition against the use of criminal process against alcoholics 79 poses
for disposition of the chronically intoxicated.
Fairness in the return process. If commitment procedures are
loose and constitutionally suspect, the process of return to the com-
munity is even more suspect because it is largely invisible." Dis-
charge is often a matter of administrative convenience; the tests
applied seldom have any observable relationship to the criteria the
legislature originally established for commitment."' In the case of
the elderly, the want of a place to live may very well control the
decision. Many states of course provide in their statutes for some
form of judicial supervision or review of the return process. 2 This
review, however, is almost always subsequent to an administrative
decision to release the patient, so that if under the circumstances
the court intervenes, it is to insist that the inmate be retained in
78 334 F.2d at 516-17 (footnotes omitted).
79 This is the question at issue in Powell v. Texas, prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S.
810 (1967) ; cf. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Easter v. District of
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. Borrero, 19 N.Y.2d 332, 227
N.E.2d 18 (1967) ; Swartz, Compulsory Legal Measures and the Concept of Illness, 19
S. CAR. L. REv. 372 (1967); Comment, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 76
YALE L.J. 1160 (1967).
80 See generally LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 123-30; Comment, 34
U. Cmrr. L. REV., supra note 61, at 654-59; Comment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV., supra
note 18, at 1007-08.
81 LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 14, at 126-28.
82 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-548 (1967) requires the hospital authorities to examine
each case at least every 6 months, and to release the individual immediately if the
conditions that justified the original involuntary hospitalization no longer exist.
Judicial redetermination is provided under N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 73
(McKinney Supp. 1967), which makes the original commitment order valid for one
year, requires new proceedings before an extension can be ordered, and limits the
extended periods to 2 years each. See MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE
CRnNAL DEFENDANT, supra note 56, at 102-07.
Another element of unfairness is that the inmate is usually required to establish
that he has recovered. Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The
procedure under N.Y. MENTAL HYIiENE LAW § 73 (McKinney Supp. 1967) cures
this by requiring new proof of condition before a new order can be entered.
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custody despite his desire to be free. This may protect the com-
munity, but it is certainly not a patient-oriented review. However,
because release procedures are almost always ex parte, in most in-
stances no one appears to advocate retention in custody if the in-
stitution elects to discharge the patient. The only exception is likely
to be a case in which the patient has a criminal record and the
prosecuting or district attorney intervenes to keep the patient under
continued custodial control. For the most part, however, the court
merely approves pro forma the administrative decision already
reached.
If administrative discharge is denied or delayed, it is possible
to seek habeas corpus to test the propriety of continued detention.
This is, in fact, the procedural medium though which most of the
present law governing mental health commitments has been de-
veloped. It is, however, a limited remedy for most inmates because
it is expensive and no subsidy of litigation expenses has been pro-
vided. But one court has now applied the right of assigned counsel
to a habeas corpus proceeding brought by an indigent to test eligibil-
ity for release,83 and other courts may follow suit. Perhaps of more
importance, as federal courts begin to recognize that federal con-
stitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection and protection
against cruel and unusual punishment pertain to the mental health
area, there will be increasing resort to federal habeas corpus
8 4
once the patient has exhausted his state remedies. In the process,
some of the due process incidental to the commitment process will
begin to be applied to the return process, though if the analogy of
criminal prosecutions compared to parole procedures is valid, at a
somewhat slower rate.
In summary, the field of mental health law remains largely
unexplored in modern constitutional jurisprudence. But the wave of
probing decisions is beginning to swell, so that in a matter perhaps
of months the rights of the mentally-ill to an ascertainable standard
for commitment, a fair adversary commitment procedure, and
medically sound treatment may well be grounded in the fourteenth
amendment.85
83 People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573, 217
N.E.2d 636 (1966).
84 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964) federal habeas corpus is available to a
state "prisoner" held "in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United
States." This should be a sufficient basis for federal inquiry into mental health deten-
tion.
85 Increasing judicial controls over involuntary commitment procedures will
accelerate efforts to use so-called "voluntary commitments." See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE,
supra note 14, at 107-15; Note, 79 HARV. L. REV., supra note 70, at 1297-98. There
is, of course, some question about how "voluntary" the commitment can be if the
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II. DUE PROCESS IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION
One might say that schools, mental hospitals and prisons are
the three custodial institutions that have been largely ignored by
judges and lawyers. The disinterest in prisons has begun to end,86
and we have see how mental hospitals are beginning to come under
judicial scrutiny. It has only been recently that school regulations
and the procedures by which they are invoked have come under
attack in the courts. The Gault decision may prove to be the excuse
if not the reason for expanded judicial examination of decisions by
school administrators that determine whether a child continues in
school. Though physical custody is not involved, deprivation of the
right to receive an education is important enough to the future of the
pupil and his family that protests against arbitrary administrative
action can be expected with increasing frequency.
The principal problem areas in the current litigation are:
schooling for minority groups;87 the substantive validity of dis-
person is mentally ill. See, for example, the test for waiver of criminal procedural rights
in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege"), as elaborated in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 439 (1963). It is probably sufficient that there be legal remedies, including
habeas corpus, to enforce the voluntary patient's desire to leave whenever he wishes.
A test case may very well arise in connection with statutes, e.g., MICH. CoMaY. LAWS
AN. 330.19a (1967), which make release of a "voluntary" minor patient contingent
on parental approval to age 21.
The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has recommended that control
over involuntary admissions be placed in an independent "review board." Laws
Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally I1, 6 GAP REPORTS AND SYM'osIUMs 141,
152-53 (No. 61, May 1966). Assuming this were not viewed as taking away con-
stitutionally-based judicial powers, due process requirements imposed on judicial
action would of course apply to the administrative substitutes as well if compelled
hospitalization were the result of the administrative action. Cf. the fate of efforts to
remove the substantive insanity issue from the jury in State v. Lang, 168 La. 958,
123 So. 639 (1929), Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931), and State v.
Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
86 See Caldwell & Brodie, Enforcement oj the Criminal Civil Rights Statute, 18
U.S.C. Section 242, in Prison Brutality Cases, 52 GEO. L.J. 706 (1964); Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Com-
plaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
87 Pertaining more to the free exercise clause than to due process, this problem
concerns the extent to which minority religious groups can be permitted to maintain
special schools that do not meet minimum state standards. It should be noted that this
is not a problem that affects Roman Catholic and most Jewish and Protestant
parochial schools, because these schools have long met the basic educational standards
required under state law. There are, however, some fringe groups that have come into
conflict with the state. The two that have had the greatest difficulty are the Amish
and certain congregations of Hasidic Jews. See Scalise, The Amish in Iowa and
Teacher Certification, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 1 (1967); Comment, The Amish School
Controversy in Iowa, 10 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 555 (1966); People v. Donner, 199
Misc. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), aff'd 278 App. Div. 705, 103 N.Y.S.2d
757, aff'd 302 N.Y. 857, 100 N.E.2d 48, appeal dismissed 342 U.S. 884 (1951). In each
instance the religious group has felt that separation from the secular community is
essential to sound religion and to survival of the body of religious believers itself, and
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ciplinary regulations; and procedural due process in the adminis-
tration of otherwise valid regulations.
Substantive validity of disciplinary regulations. This problem
turns on the substantive content of disciplinary regulations, con-
travention of which may result in disciplinary proceedings.88 The
older case law 9 almost without exception sustained the constitution-
ality of the standards of dress and conduct invoked by school ad-
ministrators as a basis for suspension or expulsion from school.
Within the past two or three years, however, there has been a
renewal of litigation in both federal and state courts, principally
concerning (a) restrictions on participation in civil rights efforts,
(b) sanctions imposed on married high school students, and (c)
limitations on dress and hairstyles.
Efforts to control peaceful expression of opinion by high
school or university students have been struck down on first amend-
ment grounds in three recent federal decisions. In Burnside v.
Byars9" the court held that an injunction should have issued against
high school officials to prevent them from enforcing a ban on
"freedom buttons" worn by students. In Hammond v. South Caro-
lina State College,9 a college rule prohibiting "parades, celebrations,
and demonstrations" without clearance from college authorities was
ruled an invalid prior restraint on freedom of expression. In Dickey
v. Alabama State Board of Education" an injunction issued to
force readmission of a student editor who ignored an official ban on
student editorials "critical of the Governor of the State of Alabama
or the Alabama Legislature," because the student's freedom under
has therefore kept its children out of the public schools and in special religious schools
in which the teachers have been ineligible for state certification and the curriculum
has not met minimum state standards.
Thus far the conflicts have usually been settled administratively, but the time
will come when the courts will be confronted with the problem. If a religious group
can in fact maintain its separate identity apart from the larger community, then it
might be argued that concepts of religious freedom permit atypical forms of religious
expression. If, however, young people in fact drift away in significant numbers into
secular society and are cultural and vocational misfits when they do, one might con-
clude that the state should see that they are given whatever education the legislature
or state school administrative authority concludes is essential to meaningful participa-
tion in society. If the latter view ultimately prevails, the result is, of course, a uniform
degree of official coercion or suasion on all segments of society.
88 See generally Comment, 37 CoLo. L. REV. 492 (1965); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 996
(1967); Comment, 11 WELFARE L. BULL. 10 (Jan. 1968).
89 E.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923) ; Jones v. Day,
127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921); Stromberg v. French, 60 N.D. 750, 236 N.W. 477
(1931).
90 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
91 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967), relying upon Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945).
92 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
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the first amendment to communicate on a matter of public interest
had been infringed.93 It seems clear that in the federal courts
students are not second-class citizens where peaceful expression of
opinion is concerned.
The increasing rate of teen-age marriages has resulted in
regulations in many school districts either requiring a married
student to withdraw from high school or limiting participation in
extracurricular activities. Though there is some judicial approval of
school regulations requiring the student to withdraw,94 there is a
longer list of decisions holding that it is arbitrary and illegal to deny
the right to schooling to one within compulsory school age or granted
the right by statute to free public education, simply because of
marriage.95 However, restrictions on extracurricular activities, which
probably reflect the fear that under-age marriages are attractive
nuisances, have fared much better; all the decisions have upheld
them thus far."' Moreover, if a girl student becomes pregnant,
whether married or not, she can be required to withdraw at least
until her child is born;97 the policy reasons invoked appear to com-
bine concern for the girl's health with an effort to deter pregnancies.
School administrators appear also to prefer short hair, clean-
shaven chins and loose and lengthy clothing. In three recent de-
cisions students expelled from school because they refused to shear
their Beatle-like locks were denied relief. Each court found that
there was a reasonable basis for the regulation, that hairstyles do
not constitute a form of expression of opinion, and that the students
and their parents suffered no harm from compelled compliance with
the regulation.98 None of the "beard" cases has yet come into the
93 Id. at 616.
94 State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302
S.W.2d 57 (1957).
95 Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929) ; Board of Educ. v.
Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. App. 1964); McLeod v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss.
468, 122 So. 737 (1929) ; State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175
N.E.2d 539 (Butler County C.P. 1961) (dictum); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) ; Anderson v.
Canyon Independent School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Alvin Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
96 Board of Directors of Independent School Dist. of Waterloo v. Green, 147
N.W.2d 854 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1967); Kissick v. Garland Independent School Dist., 330
S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381
P.2d 718 (1963).
97 State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175 N.E.2d 539 (Butler
County C.P. 1961).
98 Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Ferrell v. Dallas Inde-
pendent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966) ; Leonard v. School Comm.
of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965). In Ferrell and Leonard the
courts ignored the fact that the students were in musical groups earning income, so
that short hair might well have affected bookings.
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courts; since Negro groups often view beards as cultural symbols,
it can be anticipated that the freedom of expression element will
loom larger in those instances, on the analogy to Burnside v. Byars,99
than in the Beatle haircut situations.
It should also be noted that while litigation of these regulations
in state courts rests on state statutes and constitutional provisions,
there is an additional hurdle that must be overcome in litigating the
issue in federal court. There, it is necessary to establish not only
that the action in question violates state law, but that there is some
independent federal constitutional or statutory ground. 10 The first
amendment cases10' are an obvious illustration of an independent
federal ground; other bases invoked for federal intervention include
the Federal Civil Rights Act' °2 and constitutional vagueness.'0°
In summary, many of the cases that will arise can be disposed
of on the grounds of procedural fairness discussed below. Since,
however, suspension or expulsion even with due process is accept-
able only to the degree that the underlying standard is constitu-
tionally or legislatively valid, most expulsion cases inevitably will
require an examination of the rule invoked to justify the school
administrator's actions. It is entirely possible that a controlling
principle may be laid down in the future that a school regulation
to be enforceable must bear directly on health and safety within the
school, and not be based on some undefined concept of morality or
propriety embraced by an administrator or local school board. The
limits of permissible regulation will in effect be defined by analogy
from other areas of public regulation of private conduct.0 4
Procedural due process in the administration of valid regula-
tions. The final problem is the scope of procedural due process in
the course of disciplining, suspending and expelling students.105 The
procedural protections being sought, and granted, are essentially
those required by Gault-notice, the opportunity to be heard,
counsel and confrontation; only the equivalent to self-incrimination
99 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), supra note 90 and accompanying text.
100 See Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545, 550-51
(N.D. Tex. 1966). Exhaustion of state remedies is also required.
101 See cases cited in notes 90-92 supra.
102 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1964); see Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524
(E.D. La. 1967).
103 See Cohen v. Mississippi State Univ. of Agriculture and Applied Science, 256
F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
104 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)( (concerning
contraceptive advice to married couples) with State v. Social Hygiene, Inc., 156
N.W.2d 288 (Iowa -Sup. Ct. 1968) (on regulation of devices vending contraceptives).




seems not to be of current concern in disputes between students and
administrators.10 6
The past decade has seen the emergence of limited case author-
ity requiring that before a student can be expelled or suspended
from a public school or university, due process requires that there
be notice and some form of hearing, even though both may be ex-
tremely informal."0 The question is whether the decision in Gault
will be invoked by analogy to accelerate the tendency to intervene.
A recent decision suggesting that it will is Madera v. Board of
Education.10 8 When Victor Madera was requested to appear for a
so-called guidance conference, his mother took the letter to a legal
aid office already acting for him in a family court delinquency pro-
ceeding. An attorney from that office asked to attend the conference,
but was refused admittance. The federal district court ordered that
the attorney be permitted to attend any guidance conference because
it could "ultimately result in loss of personal liberty to a child or in
a suspension which is the functional equivalent of his explusion
from the public schools or in a withdrawal of his right to attend the
public schools." 09 The court of appeals reversed. But it is interest-
ing to note that the potential applicability of Gault to disciplinary
proceedings was in effect assumed by the appellate court, even
though quite clearly no "commitment to an institution in which the
juvenile's freedom is curtailed" was directly involved."0 Instead,
the court emphasized language in Gault suggesting that its require-
ments do not apply to early stages of proceedings involving juveniles,
and likened the guidance conference to a preliminary conference and
106 However, public school personnel who interrogate or search in order to
obtain evidence of a crime, particularly for the purpose of turning it over to police
or prosecutor, are almost certainly engaged in "state action" within the fourteenth
amendment. If so, the evidence to be admissible in any criminal prosecution against
a student (or teacher) would have to meet constitutional requirements for search and
seizure, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541
(1967) (search warrant required for fire inspection without consent) ; United States v.
Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (search of employee's desk without consent
violated right of privacy), or interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ;
see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The applicability of search and seizure exclu-
sionary rules to juvenile delinquency proceedings, and of all constitutional evidentiary
rules to other kinds of juvenile proceedings, is one of the matters left for subsequent
resolution under Gault.
"107 Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967);
Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Woody v. Burns, 188
So. 2d 56 (Fla. App. 1966); see also Note, 21 U. MIAmi L. REV. 886 (1967). State
action is required, however, so that private institutions are not regulated, usually on a
contract theory. See, e.g., Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass.
1957).
108 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) rev'g 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
109 267 F. Supp. at 369.
110 386 F.2d at 788 (quoting from In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967)).
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not an adjudicational hearing."' Therefore, it did not come within
the penumbra of Gault.
The tendency to use judicial language in contexts that the
judges originally responsible for it never contemplated is great
enough that in the future Gault will very probably constitute the
authority for subjecting school administrative activity to due process
requirements if the outcome is an immediate termination or suspen-
sion of the claim to an education, whether primary, secondary or
collegiate." 2
III. DEVELOPING STANDARDS IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
Judicial activity has been least evident in the area of welfare
administration. Here too, however, there has been an increase in
litigation concerning (a) investigative activities; (b) restrictions
on eligibility; and (c) hearing procedures." 3
Restrictions on investigative activities. One of the sorest points
in welfare administration has been the nocturnal raid to determine
if there is an unauthorized male present." 4 The ostensible goal has
been to ensure that all family income is accounted for, but in fact
enforcement appears to be infected by a considerable degree of
dominant middle class morality. The constitutionality of these
searches without prior judicial authorization is doubtful after the
1967 administrative search decisions of Camart v. Municipal
Court"5 and See v. Seattle"6 which forbid administrative intrusions
onto property unless there is either valid consent or a judicial
warrant. It seems unlikely that refusal to permit entry can properly
111 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 n.48 (1967).
112 In Goldwyn v. Allen, 54 Misc. 2d 94, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967), a
high school student was caught cheating on an examination and was denied the
right to take any further examinations. Relying on Gault the court held that the
Department of Education deprived the student of her rights by imposing sanctions
based solely on a letter of the acting principal without a hearing at which she might
defend herself with the aid of an attorney.
As an indication of how remote Gault arguments become, in United States v.
Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 1967), a minor claimed Gault and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), required a Selective Service clerk to give him privilege
warnings before letting him voice his refusal to report for duty. He argued that be-
cause the court admitted the evidence of his refusal, Gault precluded his conviction.
The court held that Gault was inapplicable since it relates only to proceedings to
determine delinquency as a result of alleged misconduct. 387 F.2d at 785.
113 For a somewhat fuller treatment, see George, The Implications of Gault for
Welfare Administration, 2 FAmIY L.Q., June 1968, at -.
114 Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J.
1347 (1963); see generally Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v.
Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 130 (1967).
115 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (private premises).
116 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commercial premises).
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be made on ostensible basis for refusing or withholding benefits,
since that is difficult to distinguish from the judicial sanctions for
non-cooperation that Camara and See invalidated.
The problem was presented in an interesting way in Parrish v.
Civil Service Commission.117 Parrish was fired from his position as
a social caseworker for insubordination after he refused to partici-
pate in a raid on the homes of suspected welfare cheaters. Though
the lower courts upheld the discharge, the California Supreme Court
ordered reinstatement because he had been ordered to engage in
unconstitutional activity, and insubordination could be premised
only on an unjustified refusal to obey a lawful order."'
The principal remedy, however, has come through administra-
tive reforms. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
has amended its Handbook of Public Assistance Administration... to
require after July 1, 1967, that states receiving federal welfare
subsidies adopt "policies and procedures for determination of
eligibility that ... will not result in practices that violate the indi-
vidual's privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his
constitutional rights."' 2 ° The amendment continues:
States must especially guard against violations in such areas as entering
a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses,
making home visits outside of working hours, and particularly making
such visits during sleeping hours; and searching in the home, for ex-
ample, in rooms, closets, drawers, or papers, to seek clues to possible
deception. 121
The result should be a modification of past abuses. 22
Improper restrictions on eligibility. Certain conditions attached
to welfare grants by administrative action are under attack in the
courts. In a California decision, 23 the welfare agency was held to
117 66 Cal. 2d 253, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
118 In an action now pending, plaintiffs in a class action are asserting that it is
unconstitutional to threaten to withhold welfare benefits unless consent is given to a
search. Bradley v. Ginsberg, 67 Civ. 3047 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 10, 1967), noted in
10 WELFARE L. BULL. 8 (Oct. 1967).
119 Transmittal 77, revising UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or HEALTh, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, HAN4DBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, §§ 2220,
2230, noted in Comment, 10 WELFARE L. BU-L. 13 (Oct. 1967). (The HANDBOOx is
not generally available.). Silver, How to Handle a Welfare Case, 4 LAw IN TRANSI-
TION Q. 87 (June 1967).
120 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 119, at pt. IV,
§ 2220, item 1.
121 Id. at pt. IV, § 2230, item 1.
122 See generally Comment, 10 WELFARE L. BULL. 13 (Oct. 1967).
123 County of Contra Costa v. Social Welfare Bd., 229 Cal. App. 2d 762, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1964). This case holds that the refusal of a mother to take a polygraph
test for the purpose of identifying the father of her illegitimate child is not as a
1968]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
have no power to condition benefits on submission to a polygraph
test requested by the district attorney for use in a paternity pro-
ceeding.
In another recent case, 24 the court ruled that the fact a family
had illegitimate children could not be made the sole basis for a
refusal of admission to public housing; a similar action in Ala-
bama125 was terminated as moot when the housing authority with-
drew its eviction notice.
Residence requirements for eligibility to receive public assis-
tance have been declared unconstitutional in four recent federal
district court opinions .' 6 The basis in part has been the equal
protection clause and in part a finding that the restriction constitutes
an unconstitutional limitation on interstate travel.127 Other similar
cases are pending, 2" and the Supreme Court has granted review.1
29
A three-judge federal district court panel in Alabama has ruled
unconstitutional an Alabama regulation terminating aid for families
with dependent children (AFDC) if there is a "father substitute" in
the home or cohabiting with the mother in or out of the home, and
has enjoined its further invocation as a basis for denying benefits. °
The constitutional rationale was once more the equal protection
clause, but the court also noted that the Alabama regulation in effect
embodied a plan previously disapproved by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare. The court observed:
It should be noted that there is no vested right for anyone to re-
ceive public financial assistance; neither the United States nor the
Alabama Constitution requires Alabama to grant financial assistance to
needy dependent children. However, once Alabama undertakes to pro-
matter of law a refusal of reasonable assistance as required by California statute.
Therefore, aid to her daughter could not be discontinued.
However, the county expressly conceded that "to force every individual welfare
applicant or recipient to undergo a polygraph examination as a condition of present
or continued eligibility would be improper." Id. at 766.
124 Thomas v. Housing Authority of Little Rock, Civ. No. LR-66-C-230 (E.D.
Ark., May 26, 1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 7 (July 1967).
125 Lewis v. Public Housing Authority of Talladega, Civ. No. CA-67-106 (N.D.
Ala. 1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 7 (July 1967).
126 Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; Harrell v. Tobriner, 36
U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. 1967); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 231 (D. Conn.
1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968) ; Green v. Department
of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967).
127 E.g., Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65, 68. (E.D. Pa. 1967); cf. Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
128 See 9 WELFARE L. BuLL. 9-10 (July 1967); 8 WELFARE L. BULL. 11 (May
1967) ; Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical
Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567 (1966).
129 Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 231 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris, noted,
36 U.S.L.W. 3278 (Jan. 16, 1968).
180 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
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vide a statutory program of assistance, it must do so in conformity
with the constitutional mandate of equal protection. Alabama cannot
pick and choose the mothers and children it will aid through the use of
some classifications which are not rationally related to the purpose of
the applicable statutes.' 8 '
In a recent New York case, the court of appeals overturned a
conviction of a welfare recipient based on his "wilfull act designed
to interfere with the proper administration of public assis-
tance. .... ,132 He had refused to accept work for which he was
physically qualified.13 3 The court held that the statute comprehends
only a fraudulent act designed to obtain benefits and that a refusal
to work cannot be classed as fraud. 4 Nor can children be used as a
means of punishing adult misconduct. A New Jersey administrative
ruling'3 5 states that AFDC assistance cannot be denied to the chil-
dren because a parent has committed welfare fraud, even though the
parent might receive some "tangential benefit" from a grant to the
children.
It may therefore be anticipated that restrictions on welfare
eligibility based other than on factors of age and income will be
systematically attacked in state and federal courts, and that the
invocation of other considerations than these two, either directly or
indirectly, will be invalidated." 6
Right to a hearing. There is increasing concern about the want
of a requirement of a hearing before welfare benefits can be with-
drawn.'3 7 Efforts are under way to test the procedures used in Cali-
fornia and Mississippi, 38 and there have been changes in adminis-
trative practices in a few states. For example, administrative rulings
in New Jersey and the District of Columbia have required that
there be a high standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt" in
New Jersey and "reasonable and substantial evidence" in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, before the "man in the house rule" can be in-
131 Id. at 40.
132 People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170, 278 N.Y.S.2d 802, 225 N.E.2d 509 (1967).
133 N.Y. SocIAL WELFARE LAW § 145 (McKinney 1966).
134 People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170, 278 N.Y.S.2d 802, 225 N.E.2d 509 (1967).
135 Matter of W., Case No. U.C.-808, N.J. Dept. of Inst. and Agencies (May
25, 1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 10 (July 1967); Matter of J., Case No.
U.C.-1858, N.J. Dept. of Inst. and Agencies (May 2, 1967), noted in 9 WELFARE
L. BULL. 10 (July 1967).
136 Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
137 Note, 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1967) ; cf. Coash & Stuart, Public Assistance Hear-
ings in Michigan, 47 MICH. ST. B.J., March 1968, at 26.
188 Wheeler v. Montgomery, No. 48303 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 20, 1967), noted in 11
WELFARE L. Bu.LL. 2 (Jan. 1968); Williams v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Works, Civ.




voked. 5 9 The New York Board of Social Services has proposed new
rules of practice for welfare agencies that would require prompt
determination, a hearing, access to material necessary for prepara-
tion, the right to representation, and review by an independent
agency.14° Transmittal 77 amending the HEW Handbook of Public
Assistance Administration also (a) requires states to "inform appli-
cants about the eligibility requirements and their rights and obliga-
tions under the program," '141 (b) demands that decisions declaring
a person ineligible for benefits be "based on facts," meaning "state-
ments about eligibility requirements that have been substantiated by
observation, or written records, or other appropriate means,"'142 and
(c) requires written notice of the reason for the action in specific
and not conclusory terms. Because of the importance of federal
funds to state welfare programs, this should have considerable effect.
The United States Supreme Court may soon require this under
the Constitution. In Thorpe v. Housing Authority,44 the Court had
before it a state court decision affirming the right of the housing
authority to evict a tenant from public housing, apparently because
of her election as president of a tenants' organization; 145 she claimed
that she was constitutionally entitled to notice of the reasons for
terminating the lease and a hearing. While the case was pending,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued
a circular to local authorities operating in part on federal funds,
stating that "it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate
without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference
or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given
an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he may
wish."14 The HUD circular required local officials to keep records
of evictions and the bases for them, and summaries of conferences.
Since Mrs. Thorpe was still in the housing because of an injunction
in her favor issued by the North Carolina Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court remanded the matter for whatever
action local authorities might wish to take under the HUD require-
ments. The North Carolina Court, however, did nothing, on the
130 Matter of D., Case No. VC-1210, N.J. Dept. of Inst. and Agencies (April 20,
1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (July 1967); Matter of C., Case No. C-29-
208-0, D.C. Dept. Pub. Welf. (April 20, 1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (July
1967).
140 10 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (Oct. 1967) (summarizing the proposed changes).
141 Supra note 119, at pt. IV, § 2230, item 2.
142 Id. at pt. IV, § 2230, item 3.
143 Id. at pt. IV, § 2220, item 5d, pt. IV, § 2230, item 5d.
144 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
145 See Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966),
vacated, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
146 Quoted in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 762 (1967).
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ground that the HUD directive was not retroactive and thus had
nothing to do with the Thorpe eviction.147 The Supreme Court once
more has granted review. 48 The Court's initial interest may have
been based on the free speech implications of the eviction, but the
specific concern manifested is over the procedures surrounding the
eviction. If, as may well be the case, the Court requires notice, con-
frontation and hearing, and perhaps the right to representation, the
earlier Gault decision offers an analogy. Whatever the specific hold-
ing in Thorpe, it is evident that procedural due process is quickly
being established as an element of welfare administration.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE
We are obviously witnessing the beginning of a new phase in
the development of constitutional doctrine. In the initial phase, when
the substantive norms and procedural systems of the common law,
civil and criminal, began to break down as the nation grew and
the population became increasingly concentrated in the cities, legis-
latures enacted new statutes to cope with new problems. Out of this
legislative activity came expanded criminal codes, juvenile court
legislation, mental health commitment proceedings, and a patchwork
of welfare and public assistance legislation, much of the latter in
response to federal grants-in-aid. Public regulation replaced private
concern. Though each new statutory system was attacked in the
courts, the basis of the attack was the legitimacy of the legislative
entry into the field, and the emphasis was on whether taxpayers or
property owners were deprived of their property without due
process of law, or whether the legislation was an improper delega-
tion of legislative power or an unwarranted interference with tradi-
tional judicial powers. For the most part, however, the courts
acknowledged that legislatures could properly act to meet new prob-
lems, whatever the increased costs to the taxpayer.
New systems, however, quickly mature into permanent estab-
lishments, and the basic motivation to help individuals tends to be
displaced by an insistence on bureaucratic regularity. Class distinc-
tions that Americans profess not to exist, but that nevertheless
operate everywhere, become reflected in the daily operation of the
system; public employees still remain people, and their personal
expectations and prejudices color public administration itself. Those
with influence and means, or those who succeed in enlisting the
patronage of the influential, are treated in a preferred way, while
147 Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1967), cert.
granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1968).
148 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1968).
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others without means or influence are subject to official whim. The
result is a magnification of racial and economic stratification in the
community. The new step in evolution reflects the use of the powers
of one part of the governmental structure, chiefly the judiciary, to
control administrative excesses in other parts of that structure. Put-
ting the matter another way, the first phase of legislative activity
was concerned with assistance to classes or groups; the new phase
of judicial activity has fairness in the individual case as its objective.
The path of evolution in the new phase is already reasonably
well-defined. In criminal procedure, the initial effort was to cure a
few gross abuses in the system. 49 In recent years the Supreme Court
has dealt with almost every detail of the criminal trial'50 and has
sought to regulate the details of police investigation as well.' 51 But
it would appear that the final step in judicial reformation of crim-
inal procedure will be use of the equal protection clause, principally
in the context of representation by counsel, subsidy of defense
preparation, and review, to eliminate as far as possible the factor of
means as the determinant of the ultimate outcome of a prosecution.
This effort to provide constitutional equality can of course be only
partly successful; there is already a shortage of attorneys to repre-
sent defendants, and there are some parts of the law enforcement
process, particularly the discretion exercised by police and prose-
cutor whether to arrest or prosecute, that are exceedingly difficult to
control and that will continue to be invested to a degree by class and
racial distinctions. But the fact that more and more attorneys
appear in criminal cases cannot help but imbue judges and law en-
forcement personnel with a sense of caution. As indicated earlier,
though the primary concern will continue to be with procedures,
inevitably there will be a re-evaluation of the substantive norms
invoked through them.
Therefore, the direction of evolution is clear from the criminal
procedure field. Gault places an official constitutional imprimatur on
149 E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (brutality in obtaining evi-
dence) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (trial court use of confession
known to have been coerced); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (knowing
use by prosecution of false evidence) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-
dominated trial).
15 E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process) ; Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363 (1966) (impartial jury) ; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prejudicial
publicity); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibition against prosecutor
comment on privilege) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation) ; Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
151 E.g., Katz v. United States, 388 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic eavesdropping);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 262 (1967) and Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (lineups) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (interrogation) ; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (search and seizure exclusionary rule).
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the same investigation into juvenile court processes; within a decade
all aspects of juvenile court procedure and substantive standards
will no doubt be thoroughly revamped, either by legislative action to
forestall constitutional review or through judicial mandate. Specht
v. Patterson,52 Pate v. Robinson 5 ' and Baxstrom v. Herold54 may
be the early warnings that an examination of mental health proce-
dures is about to begin. The fact that welfare norms in Shapiro
v. Thompson'5 and hearing procedures in Housing Authority v.
Thorpe56 are now to be considered by the Supreme Court suggests
that constitutional regulation of the welfare fields is imminent. If
welfare standards and procedures are subject to revision on constitu-
tional grounds, it can be only a matter of time until school regula-
tions are also reviewed. The importance of Gault, in short, does not
lie as much in the specific changes it decrees for juvenile delinquency
proceedings as it does in the judicial intervention in protective pro-
cesses it symbolizes.
At the same time, it is evident that amplified judicial supervi-
sion of essentially social processes exposes the judiciary to a greater
degree of public criticism and even hostility than it has usually ex-
perienced. As long as judicial doctrines affect only litigants or govern
only judicial proceedings themselves, public interest in them is
transient or non-existent. If, however, citizens feel that new deci-
sions threaten cherished abstractions,'15 7 that dangerous elements are
no longer controlled,' 58 or that a sharp increase in tax rates has been
dictated, 15 9 they are likely to react sharply against the courts that
have brought this about. A general acceptance of concepts like fair-
ness, justice or due process of law may prove to be wanting if the
result of invoking those concepts in a particular case is to free an
undesirable from official control or to increase public expenditures
on him. Continuous creation in an expanding universe may be the
152 386 U.S. 605 (1967), supra note 50 and accompanying text.
153 383 U.S. 375 (1966), supra note 57 and accompanying text.
154 383 U.S. 107 (1966), supra note 56 and accompanying text.
155 270 F. Supp. 231 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3278
(U.S. Jan. 16, 1968), supra note 129 and accompanying text.
156 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S.
Mar. 5, 1968), supra note 147 and accompanying text.
157 For example, the concept of freedom to buy and sell property. The Supreme
Court holding that California's "Proposition 14" denied equal protection to minority
purchasers and renters in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), does not eliminate
the prejudice that underlay the majority vote in the referendum that adopted the
outlawed rule.
158 This of course underlies fears of "crime in the streets" and "handcuffing the
police." The question is not whether these fears are rational or objectively sustainable;
rather, it is the citizens' belief that these conditions exist as a result of judicial decisions
which is important.
159 This is an obvious result of changes in welfare law administration or of
decisions declaring a right in involuntary mental patients to have qualified treatment.
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inevitable outgrowth of the American system of a written constitu-
tion authoritatively interpreted by a federal judiciary; it may also
be the most desirable flowering of the judicial process. But the entry
of judicial power into these new fields presages a difficult period in
the history of the American judicial system.
